Single and multi agent reinforcement learning algorithms to synthetize agents behaviour: Examples in life science Workshop Program synthesis, Bordeaux, 2024

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Principles of Reinforcement Learning



What is reinforcement Learning?

Definition (Wikipedia)

Reinforcement learning (RL) is an interdisciplinary area of machine learning and optimal control concerned with how an intelligent agent ought to take actions in a dynamic environment in order to maximize the cumulative reward. Reinforcement learning is one of three basic machine learning paradigms, alongside supervised learning and unsupervised learning.

RL is based on the Markov Decision Process (MDP) framework, which allows to represent sequential decision problems under uncertainty.



> Markov Decision Processes

A MDP is defined as a tuple $\langle S, D, P, r/c \rangle$, where:

- \blacktriangleright S is a (generally finite) set of states of the controlled system.
- $\blacktriangleright \ \mathcal{D}$ is a (generally finite) set of decisions.
- ▶ *P* is a transition function. P(s'|s, d) is the probability that the system, initially in state $s \in S$ transitions to state $s' \in S$ when decision $d \in D$ is applied.
- ▶ r (resp. c) is a reward (resp. cost) function associated to transitions. r(s, d, s') is the reward obtained when a transition (s, d, s') occurs.

Solving a MDP amounts to finding a policy $\pi : S \times \{0, \dots, H-1\} \rightarrow D$, optimizing the expected sum of rewards/costs obtained during a finite number of steps¹, *H*.

$$V^{\pi}(s) = \mathbb{E}^{\pi} \left[\sum_{t=0}^{H-1} r(S_t, \pi^t(S_t), S_{t+1}) | S_0 = s, \pi \right]$$

¹Classical other objective exist for infinite horizon: Average cost, discounted cost...



> Solving Markov Decision Processes

In the finite state/decision spaces case, there exists an optimal policy π^* (such that $V^{\pi^*}(s) \ge V^{\pi}(s), \forall \pi, \forall s \in S$). Furthermore,

- ▶ π^* can be computed efficiently (i.e. in time polynomial in H, |S|, |D|), using, e.g. dynamic programming, or linear programming.
- However, when S, D are multidimensionnal or continuous, or when the problem is partially observed, or when the model is unknown and accessible only through simulation...
- > Dynamic Programming can no more be efficiently applied!
- ▶ (Deep) Reinforcement Learning approaches may be the solution...

Reinforcement Learning in MDP (ex: infinite H. Q-learning)



$$\langle \mathbf{s}, \mathbf{d}, \mathbf{s}', \mathbf{c} \rangle \Rightarrow Q^n(\mathbf{s}, \mathbf{d}) \leftarrow (1 - \alpha)Q^{n-1}(\mathbf{s}, \mathbf{d}) + \alpha \left(\mathbf{c} + \gamma \min_{\mathbf{d}'} Q^{n-1}(\mathbf{s}', \mathbf{d}')\right)$$

 (Q^n) converges to Q^* when $n \to +\infty$!



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> Deep Q-Network algorithm (infinite horizon)

- Uses a neural network to "learn" the Q-function from observed trajectories
- Handles multidimensional continuous state spaces (finite decision space)
- Data Consuming !





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Some challenges in RL raised by applications

- > Partial observability: Innovation adoption in agriculture
- Non-Markovian process: Cancer treatment follow-up
- Multiple Learning Agents: Anti-poaching



Challenge 1: partial observability Innovation Adoption in agriculture



> Innovation adoption example²

Objective: Design of public policies aiming at increase the adoption rate of an innovation (communicating water meters in irrigated agriculture)



- Agent: Public Authority
- State: mental state of farmers and interaction network (complex state, unobserved)
- ► Reward: Increase of #adopters
- Decision: parameters of 3 levers. Environmental protection awareness, training, subsidies
- Observation: #adopters, available budget, remaining time steps

²[Vinyals et al., 2023] Towards AI-designed innovation diffusion policies using agent based simulations and reinforcement learning: the case of digital tool adoption in agriculture INRA@ RL for complex sequential decision problems November, 27, 2024 / Régis Sabbadin > Innovation adoption example²

Objective: Design of public policies aiming at increase the adoption rate of an innovation (communicating water meters in irrigated agriculture)



- The state is perceived only through partial observations
- Complex transitions, simulated by the Gama simulator
- The mental reconstruction of the state depends on histories of past actions/observations
- States and actions are continuous / high-dimensional

 Fits the POMDP framework!
 ²[Vinyals et al., 2023] Towards AI-designed innovation diffusion policies using agent based simulations and reinforcement learning: the case of digital tool adoption in agriculture
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Partially Observable Markov Decision Process





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Partially Observable Markov Decision Process



POMDP Definition

A POMDP is defined by a tuple (S, D, P, Ω, Z, c) .

- State of the process: $s \in S$;
- Decision: $d \in D$;
- Transition probability: P(s'|s, d);
- Observation: $\omega \in \Omega$;
- Observation function: $Z(\omega|s, d, s')$;
- ► Cost function: c(s, d, s').



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Partially Observable Markov Decision Process



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A POMDP can be seen as a MDP where "states" are replaced with histories or, equivalently, by belief states, computed from trajectories



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- ▶ In a POMDP, we do not observe s_t , but noisy observations ω_t
- ► A t-step history $h_t = (\omega_0, d_0, \omega_1, d_1, \dots, \omega_{t-1}) \in \mathcal{H}_t$ summarizes our probabilistic belief b_t about the state s_t
- ► In a finite-horizon POMDP, optimal policies are history dependent



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$$\pi = \{\pi_t, \}_{t=0,\dots,H-1}, \text{ where } \pi_t : \mathcal{H}_t \to D_t$$

$$\underbrace{V(\pi, s)}_{\text{Criterion to optimize}} = \underbrace{\mathbb{E}\left[\sum_{t=0}^{H-1} c(H_t, D_t, S_t) \mid S_0 = s, \pi, D_t \sim \pi_t(H_t)\right]}_{\text{Expected long-term cost following policy } \pi}$$

$$\underbrace{V^*(s)}_{\text{Value function}} = \underbrace{\min_{\pi \in \Pi} V(\pi, s)}_{\text{Minimization over the set of policies } \Pi.}$$



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- A t-step history $h_t = (\omega_0, d_0, \omega_1, d_1, \dots, \omega_{t-1}) \in \mathcal{H}_t$ summarizes our probabilistic belief b_t about the state s_t
- In a finite-horizon POMDP, optimal policies are history dependent POMDP are far more difficult to solve than usual MDP!



> Solution approaches





> Solution approaches

Modelled problem





Challenge 2: Non-Markovian process Cancer treatment follow-up (related to Orlane Rossini's PhD thesis)







Figure: Example of a patient's data^a

^aIUCT Oncopole and CRCT, Toulouse, France

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- Patients who have had a cancer benefit from regular follow-up;
- The concentration of clonal immunoglobulin is measured over time;
- The doctor must make new decisions at each visit.

> Medical Context



Figure: Example of a patient's data^a

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- Patients who have had a cancer benefit from regular follow-up;
- The concentration of clonal immunoglobulin is measured over time;
- The doctor must make new decisions at each visit.

 \implies Optimize decision-making to ensure the patient's quality of life

> Piecewise-Deterministic Markov Process

A Piecewise-Deterministic Markov Process is defined through three local features





> Piecewise-Deterministic Markov Process

A Piecewise-Deterministic Markov Process is defined through three local features



The flow

The deterministic part of the process

 $\phi_{m,k}^{\ell}(\zeta,t)$



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Piecewise-Deterministic Markov Process

A Piecewise-Deterministic Markov Process is defined through three local features



Jump intensity

Description of the jump mechanism of the process

Boundary jump (deterministic)

$$t_m^{\ell \star}(\zeta) = \inf\{t > \mathsf{o} : \phi_{m,k}^{\ell}(\zeta, t) \in \{\zeta_\mathsf{o}, D\}\}$$

Random (continuous time) jumps

$$\mathbb{P}(T > t) = e^{-\int_0^t \lambda_m^\ell(\phi_{m,k}^\ell(\zeta,t)) \,\mathrm{d}s}$$

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Piecewise-Deterministic Markov Process

A Piecewise-Deterministic Markov Process is defined through three local features





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> Controlled Piecewise-Deterministic Markov Process Example of cancer treatment follow-up

Random jump from a deterministic regime to the next





Controlled Piecewise-Deterministic Markov Process Example of cancer treatment follow-up

Random jump from a deterministic regime to the next



Let the patient state be $x = (m, k, \zeta, u)$:

- *m* disease "mode";
- k number of relapses;
- ζ biomarker value;
- ▶ *u* time since last jump.



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Controlled Piecewise-Deterministic Markov Process Example of cancer treatment follow-up

Random jump from a deterministic regime to the next



Let the patient state be $x = (m, k, \zeta, u)$:

- *m* disease "mode";
- k number of relapses;
- ζ biomarker value;
- ▶ *u* time since last jump.

Let *d* be the decision: $d = (\ell, r)$:

- *l* treatment;
- r time till next visit.



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Monte-Carlo planning solution approach³





Solving through history-based POMDP transformation

³de Saporta et al., Medical follow-up optimization: A Monte-Carlo planning strategy, 2024,

https://hal.science/hal-04382747v1



- Model-free algorithms require lots of data or a simulator
- Model-based algorithms require less data (but prior knowledge of model structure)⁵

⁴Orlane Rossini's PhD thesis

⁵Codes available at https://forgemia.inra.fr/orlane.le-quellennec/controlled_pdmp_po

Challenge 3: Multiple learning agents Anti-poaching (Prasanna Maddila's PhD thesis)







- We want to solve a subclass of stochastic games, where
 - Some agents are cooperative, ...
 - and the others independently compete with the team.
- We can formally model Anti-Poaching in this sub-class
 - where rangers cooperate against independent poachers.



Partially Observable Stochastic Games



Figure: Simulation of a time-step in a POSG



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- Each agent has a local history $h_i^t = (d_i^0, \omega_i^1, d_i^1, \dots, d_i^{t-1}, \omega_i^t).$
- Local (mixed) policy $\pi_i(h_i^t) \in \Delta(\mathcal{D}_i)$
- Transitions and rewards depend on joint decisions
- value of a joint policy:

$$\mathbf{v}_{\pi,i}(h_i^t) = \mathbb{E}_{\pi} \left[\sum_{\tau=t}^{H} \gamma^{ au-t} \mathbf{R}_i^{ au} \middle| h_i^t
ight]$$
 (1)

A Nash Equilibrium is a joint policy (π_i^{*})_{i∈I} from which no agent has interest to deviate: ∀i ∈ I, ∀π_i

$$v_{\pi_i^*}(h) \ge v_{(\pi_i,\pi_{-i}^*)}(h)$$
 (2)23

> Solving Partially Observable Stochastic Games

- POSG are an extension of both POMDP and normal-form games
- How can we compute joint equilibrium policies ?

Exact solution method:

- Dynamic programming⁶
- but only for small games

Reinforcement learning approaches?

- There exists Reinforcement Learning approaches⁷
- ... which are often used for 2-player games
- ... or for for purely competitive/cooperative games

⁶[Hansen et al., 2004] ⁷[Yang and Wang, 2021]

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> The Anti-Poaching Game



Figure: Visualisation of the Anti-Poaching Game

- ► The game has two types of agents: Rangers $(i \in \mathcal{I})$ and Poachers $(j \in \mathcal{P})$
 - playing in a grid-world of fixed size
 - during a finite horizon (o $\leq t \leq H$).
- ▶ Rangers can move or skip their turn $\forall i \in \mathcal{R}$, $\mathcal{D}_i = \{\emptyset, \uparrow, \downarrow, \leftarrow, \rightarrow\}$
- ▶ Poachers can also place traps. $\forall j \in \mathcal{P}$,
 - $\mathcal{D}_{\textbf{j}} = \{ \emptyset, \uparrow, \downarrow, \leftarrow, \rightarrow, \textsf{place-trap} \}$

> The Anti-Poaching Game



Figure: Visualisation of the Anti-Poaching Game

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- A state s ∈ S, is described by the state of all "active" objects in the grid.
- Each agent receives *noisy* observations of their cell at each timestep.
- A poacher is
 - rewarded for a prey recovered from a trap,
 - and penalised if he loses a trap, or gets captured.

The reward functions have a specific structure

> Rewards with a Specific Structure ...

► Rangers have identical reward functions: ∀i₁, i₂ ∈ 𝔅, ∀s, a, b^a

 $R_{i_1}(s,a,b) = R_{i_2}(s,a,b)$

Poachers' rewards are independent:

 $R_j(s, a, b) = R_j(s, a, (b_j, b'_{-j}))$

• The game is zero sum i.e. $\forall s, a, b$:

$$\sum_{i \in \mathcal{R}} R_i(s, a, b) + \sum_{j \in \mathcal{P}} R_j(s, a, b) = 0$$

 $a = (a_i)_{i \in \mathcal{R}}$, joint team action and $b = (b_j)_{j \in \mathcal{P}}$ joint adversary action RL for complex sequential decision problems November, 27, 2024 / Régis Sabbadin



Figure: Interaction graph between agents

Simulation Model for Transitions



Figure: Transition Simulation Model for the Anti-Poaching game

Transition probabilities $s^t \xrightarrow{d^t} s^{t+1}$ are $P(s^{t+1} | s^t, d^t)$

- They are difficult to calculate and store!
 - due to the size of the state and action spaces.
- ► So, they are simulated, which allows to
 - implement a simulator
 - use Reinforcement Learning

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To facilitate the development of new algorithms for this game,

- The Anti-Poaching Environment (APE) in Python using the PettingZoo API [Terry et al., 2021] is provided :
 - https://forgemia.inra.fr/chip-gt/ antipoaching
- ... which makes it easy to use with existing RL libraries.
 - notably RLlib[Liang et al., 2018], which proposes multi-agent RL algorithms.

/ Welcome to Anti-Poaching Environment (APE)'s documentation!

View page source

Welcome to Anti-Poaching Environment (APE)'s documentation!



Fig. 1 Fig. Instance of APE with 2 Rangers (blue) vs 4 Poachers (red)

APE is a PettingZoo environment that implements the Anti-Poaching Game. This is a multi-agent, zero-sum, cooperative-competitive game played between a team of Rangers and some independent Poachers on a grid.

We first quickly introduce Anti-Poaching Environment (APE) and how to use it with the given examples. A more detailed explanation of the examples, notably the integration with RLib is given in Examples, implementation lists the entire API for APE and the RLib integration.

- Anti-Poaching Environment (APE)
- Installation
- Using APE
- Examples and the RLlib Interface
- Manual policie
- Rilib examples

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Concluding Remarks



POMDP and RL for complex sequential decision problems

- POMDP form a "classical" powerful representation framework for studying sequential decision problems under uncertainty
- ▶ POMDP can be conveniently be modelled, using e.g. the Gymnasium API⁸
- POMDP are far harder to solve than MDP. they can be solved using off-the-shelf RL librairies⁹ (including deep-RL)
- > POMDPs can also model non- (semi-) Markovian decision processes
- Finally, game-theoretic extensions of POMDPs allow to model multi-agent decision problems. Dedicated API+solution algorithms exist¹⁰!

⁸https://gymnasium.farama.org/ ⁹For example, RLlib https://docs.ray.io/en/latest/rllib/ ¹⁰PettigZoo:https://pettingzoo.farama.org/









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